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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine different shocks to Israel’s business cycle from 1960 to 2007 in 
terms of the relationship between military expenditures and inequality, Gini coefficient. We begin with 
the assumption that there is a direct effect of higher military expenditures on income inequality levels 
in Israel. To capture this, we use the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model to conduct this 
kind of different shock analysis and find that military expenditures shock (a rise) has a statistically 
significant effect on the Gini coefficient index after the first 3 years. This finding implies that military 
expenditures policies lead to inequality (Gini coefficient) in Israel. 
Key Words: Military expenditures; income inequality (Gini coefficient); Israel; Structral VAR 
analysis.
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Introduction
The relationship between military expenditures and inequality is an interesting 
subject; however, it has received marginal attention among empirical and theoretical 
researchers. Moreover, it is not well documented within the empirical literature. Despite 
this, as Lin and Ali (2009) mentions, numerous studies have uncovered the linkages 
between military expenditures and other macroeconomic variables, such as economic 
growth, unemployment, purchasing power parity, black market premium, poverty and 
investment.
In fact, due to certain limitations, only a few studies within the scholarly literature 
have focused on the relationship between military expenditures and inequality. The major 
limitations of these studies are the availability and reliability of data. In addition to the 
problem of lack of data, the reliability of the official military expenditures data provided 
by national governments is also unclear. Additionally, there are difficulties in comparing 
income distributions of countries with different economic structures. 
Due to these problems, there are a limited number of studies focusing on this 
relationship on a global scale. For instance, Lin and Ali (2009) examine the causal
relationship between military expenditures and inequality using BVC and SIPRI data 
across 58 countries from 1987 to 1999. Moreover, Hirnissa, Habibullah, and Baharom 
(2008) investigate the causality between military expenditures and income inequality in 
selected Asian countries namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, India and 
South Korea for the period 1970-2005. The authors analyze the impact of military 
expenditures on income inequality and the impact of income inequality on military 
expenditures as well.
Further, Ali and Galbraith (2003) analyze the effect of military expenditures on 
inequality controlling for the size of armed forces, GDP growth, per capita income and 
other possible determinants by using a panel regression with country level observations 
from 1987-1997. Additionally, Hyatt (2003) examines the social cost of security by using a 
cross-national study of military expenditures and well-being.
Due to the lack of availability information on its statistics and data, analyzing the
relationship between military expenditures and inequality for a specific country can 
provide more reliable empirical evidence. Exploring the impact of a short-term conflict and 
a temporary increase in military expenditures on inequality is difficult. Therefore, in 
consideration of the fact that the Israeli-Arab conflict is one of the longest conflicts in 
recent history, Israel will be analyzed in this study.
The Israeli-Arab conflict is a complicated issue. Abu Qarn and Abu-Baders (2008) 
show the existence of an arms race between Israel and Arab countries. The findings of this 
study suggest weak causality that runs from Israel to Arab countries’ military expenditures
and bidirectional causality between Israel and Syria. There are also political and military 
interventions by super powers in this oil rich region. In addition to the limitations of global 
analyses on the relationship between military expenditures and inequality discussed above, 
the complicated nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict makes it more difficult to analyze this 
relationship regionally. 
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between military expenditures and 
inequality in Israel for the period 1960-2007 by using Gini coefficient. Because, as 
Hirnissa, Habibullah, and Baharom (2008) state, we believe military expenditures and 
income inequality has been an important component in economy. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of the studies that have focused on 
the relationship between military expenditures and income inequality. In Section 3, we 
explain the SVAR model for income inequality and defense expenditures and the results of 
the empirical model. Section 4 will conclude the paper.
Review of the Related Literature
There may be a number of possible links between military expenditures and income 
inequality. In fact, as Lin and Ali (2009) mention, theoretically, there are several ways in 
which military expenditures may affect inequality. However, this link is constructed based 
on the spending impacts of military expenditures. Furthermore, the results of the few 
studies that have been done in this area are often mixed. In other words, the papers 
investigating this relationship give conflicting results. Within this regard, the results of 
Henderson et al. (2008) indicate that an increase in the military expenditures of a country 
will improve income equality. However, other studies such as Abell (1994), Auvinen and 
Nafziger (2002), Ali and Galbraith (2003), and Ali (2007) find an opposite effect. 
On the other hand, Abell (1994) examines the relationship between military 
expenditures and income inequality in the United States during the post-Vietnam War 
period. In the paper, two measures of income were used: the difference between the highest 
and lowest quintiles of aggregate family income and the Gini coefficient. The OLS results 
indicate that increases in military expenditures are associated with increasing income 
inequality for both measures. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) claim that the ratio of military 
expenditures to income is associated with income inequality. More recent work by 
Auvinen and Nafziger (2002) concludes that these two variables can be the source of 
humanitarian emergencies. By analyzing this result, it can be also claimed that inequality 
can affect military expenditures. Ali (2007) examines the effect of military expenditures on 
income inequality using a panel regression at the country level of observation from 1987-
1997. Results reveal that there is a positive effect of military expenditures on income 
inequality.
Further, the findings of the panel unit root tests of Lin and Ali (2009) indicate that 
two inequality measures (the level of inequality and the Household Income Inequality Data 
Set) under consideration are likely to be non-stationary. Moreover, the results of Hirnissa, 
Habibullah, and Baharom (2008) indicate that “one way causality running from military 
expenditures to income inequality only for the case of Malaysia and bidirectional causality 
for the case of Singapore. As for the remaining countries, no meaningful relationship could 
be detected and it can be seen as sign of good governance in these countries” (Hirnissa, 
Habibullah, and Baharom, 2008).
Ali and Galbraith (2003) estimate that there is a positive effect of military 
expenditure on pay inequality. Within this regard, their results show a positive and 
significant relationship between military expenditures and inequality. Given the close 
relationship between pay and income the result suggests that a country’s reduction in 
military expenditures could reduce income inequality. Hyatt (2003) suggests increase in 
military spending may reduce life expectancy at birth. His findings also suggest that there 
is a differential in the impact of military expenditures by gender. The author shows that 
“The negative effect of resource allocation for security may be as much as 50 percent 
greater on the life expectancy of women than for that of men” (Hyatt, 2003).
On the other hand, there are several academic studies that have focused on the 
spending impacts of military expenditures on certain variables, such as employment and 
economic growth. In fact, as Ali and Galbraith (2003) mention, much work has been done 
on the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth. The relationship 
between military expenditures and economic growth has been analyzed frequently in the 
literature. In the literature, as Kalyoncu and Yucel (2005) state, there is much controversy 
over whether this military expenditure is associated with higher or lower growth rates. 
Nevertheless, pioneering work by Benoit (1973), Karagol and Palaz (2004), Klein (2004), 
Kollias et al. (2004), Dunne et al. (2005), Heo and Eger (2005), Reitschuler and Loening 
(2005), and some others have had controversial findings. Within this regard,
Kalyoncu and Yucel (2005) have used an analytical approach to investigate 
relationship between military expenditures and economic growth for Turkey and Greece.
The authors found that long-run equilibrium exist between military expenditures and 
income for Turkey and Greece. Further, Looney (1993) examines the relationship between 
defence spending and budgetary allocation in twelve Middle Eastern and North 
African/Mediterranean countries. His main findings show that defence budgetary trade-offs 
in the third world are complex.
It might be expected that a variable that impacts economic growth also impacts 
employment. However, there is little empirical evidence that military expenditures affect 
employment. Smith (1978), Chester (1978), and Dunne and Smith (1990) claim that 
military expenditures do not have a significant effect on employment. However, Abell 
(1990) and Yildirim and Sezgin (2003) argue that military expenditures negatively affect 
employment. Economic growth, stimulated demand, and employment are the most 
common links between military expenditures and income inequality, but there may be 
other links, such as budget reallocation, tax policies, or the creation of employment for 
unskilled labor. Therefore, avoiding this complicated issue and focusing on the empirical 
evidence of a direct relationship between these two variables can lead to a stronger 
conclusion.  
As we mentioned above, the problem of lack of data and the difficulty in comparing 
different economic and social systems has led us to analyze this relationship for a specific 
country, Israel. Due to the long-standing Israeli-Arab conflict, Israel has one of the highest 
defense burdens in the world. This conflict, as well as interventions by super powers to 
these oil rich lands, makes this area one of the most volatile regions in the world; thus, 
Israel has attracted the most attention by defense economics researchers. This historical 
background and high defense burden also makes Israel a suitable country for investigating 
the relationship between military expenditures and income inequality.
Methodology and Inference
In this section, we empirically examine the impact of military expenditures on 
inequality in Israel for the period 1970 to 2007. We assume that higher military 
expenditures have a direct effect on inequality level in Israel. To capture this, we use the 
Gini coefficient1 for income inequality and military expenditures variables. We use data 
taken from the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, which includes income surveys, 
                                                            
1 Gathered by the authors from several sources (including the world income inequality database, income 
surveys, and several scholarly papers). 
military expenditures series, and several databases. All data were converted to natural 
logarithmic form before analyzing.
We use the Structural Vector Aoutoregressive (SVAR) model to analyze the 
relationship between income inequality and military expenditures for Israel. Structural 
vector autoregressions can be used to address the following questions: How does the 
economy respond to different economic shocks? What is the contribution of the different 
shocks to the business cycle in terms of the relationship between income inequality and 
military expenditures? 
Sims (1981, 1986), Bernanke (1986), and Shapiro and Watson (1988) put forward a 
new kind of econometric model that is now known as structural VAR (SVAR), or 
identified VAR approach. The major point of structural VAR estimation is to obtain non-
recursive orthogonalization of the error terms for impulse-response analysis. This 
alternative to the recursive Cholesky orthogonalization requires the user to impose enough 
restrictions to identify the orthogonal (structural) components of the error terms.
Let yt be a k-element vector of the endogenous variables, and let    tt eeE be the 
residual covariance matrix. The SVAR model developed by Amisano and Gannini (1997) 
is used for the following analysis. The model can be written as; 
tt ue      (1)
where te and tu are vectors of length k. te is the observed (or reduced form) residuals, 
while tu is the unobserved structural innovations.  and  are kk  matrices to be 
estimated. The structural innovations tu are assumed to be orthonormal, its covariance 
matrix is an identify matrix   IeeE tt  . The assumption of orthonormal innovations 
tu imposes to the following identifying restrictions on  and  :
  (2)
equation (2) is symmetric, where this imposes a 2/)1( kk restriction on the 22k unknown 
elements in  and  . In order to identify  and  , we need to supply at least 
2/)13(2/)1(2 2  kkkkk additional restrictions. 
A SVAR model allows one to impose both short- and long-run restrictions, consistent 
with theory. However, a VAR model does not allow this and a vector error correction 
model (VECM) only allows one to impose long-run restrictions. 
First, with respect to causality analysis, we check the causality between two variables 
and notice that the military expenditures cause the Gini coefficient in this period. We 
construct bootstrap percentile 95% confidence intervals to illustrate parameter uncertainty 
following the approach in Hall (1992). We consider responses of up to 10 years ahead and 
use 1000 bootstrapped replications. The lag lengths of the VAR model are selected using 
the Akaike Information criterion and the optimal lag length is one.
The SVAR model includes the Gini coefficient for income inequality denoted as 
GINI and military expenditures denoted as DE. We use a non-recursive structural VAR 
model, which has the following restrictions:
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Here, uGINI and uDE are the structural disturbances--that is, income inequality shocks and 
military expenditures shocks, respectively--and εGINI and εDE are the residuals in the 
reduced form equations, representing unexpected disturbances. The first equation 
represents a contemporaneous response of military expenditures to income inequality 
shocks. The second equation describes no contemporaneous relationship between military
expenditures and income inequality.
The impulse response functions of the impact of an income inequality shock and a 
military expenditures shock on income inequality and military expenditures are plotted in 
Figures 1 and 2, respectively:
[insert figure 1 and 2]
We start with the results on the impact of a shock in military expenditures on the Gini 
coefficient index. Military expenditures shock (a rise) has a statistically significant effect 
on the Gini coefficient index after the first 3 years for Israel. A Gini coefficient index 
shock has a statistically insignificant effect on military expenditures for the entire 10-year 
horizon as anticipated. 
Conclusion
We examined the impact of military expenditures shocks on income inequality over 
short-term horizons. We achieved this goal through using a SVAR model. Our main 
finding is that military expenditures have a statistically positive impact on income 
inequality (the Gini coefficient). This finding implies that military expenditures policies 
will contribute to income inequality in Israel in the future.   
Regarding the reaction of military expenditures causing a positive shock to the Gini 
index, we find that as military expenditures increase, the Gini coefficient increases. This 
information is useful to make two points: (1) in forecasting military expenditures, policy 
makers need to model the impact of military expenditures on the Gini coefficient, and (2) 
in economies where the Gini coefficient is high; there will be added pressure on the 
efficiency of the business cycle.
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FIGURES
Figure 1: The response of the Gini index (income inequality) to a shock in defense 
expenditures
Figure 2: The response of defense expenditures to a shock in the Gini index (income 
inequality) for Israel.
